NOVEMBER 17 2016

Lawrence H. Summers, Summers Blog: A badly designed US stimulus will only hurt the working class. Populist economics will play out differently in the US than in emerging markets. But the results will be no better. All with a stake in the global economy must hope that now, as has happened often in the past, a US president faced with the responsibility of governing preserves the valid core of campaign economic plans while making major adjustments. Not even US presidents with political mandates can repeal the laws of economics.

Olivier Blanchard, PIIE: In Light of the Elections: Recession, Expansion, and Inequality. So, in the end, expansion or recession will depend on the balance between macroeconomic and trade measures. My own guess is the first will dominate, and growth will be sustained, at least for some time. Will it be enough to satisfy those who voted for Donald Trump, worried about their incomes and their futures? I am not so sure. Growth will indeed lift most boats. But many measures will push in the opposite direction. Lower corporate taxes, lower personal taxes on the rich, and financial deregulation will increase the share of output going to capital (this probably explains in part what is happening to the stock market). Tariffs on foreign goods may save some middle class jobs but will destroy others and increase the cost of living for those at the bottom end of the income distribution. Inequality may well go up, not down

Zidong An, IMF:The Evidence that Growth Creates Jobs: A New Look at an Old Relationship. New research from the IMF looks at Okun’s Law and asks, based on the evidence, will growth create jobs? The findings show a striking variation across countries in how employment responds to GDP growth over the course of a year. In some countries, when growth picks up, employment goes up and unemployment falls; in other countries the response is quite muted. A pick-up in growth—through a stimulus to the demand side of the economy, for instance increased government spending on infrastructure—will result in more jobs.

Heather Hurlburt, Project Syndicate:The Myth of the Women’s Vote. It may seem surprising that only 54% of the female electorate voted for Hillary Clinton, the first woman nominated for president by a major party. But while gender is a strong marker for how Americans think about certain issues, it is not the best predictor of how they will vote. It turns out that female candidates do not face a single gender gap, but rather multiple gender gaps.

Stumbling and Mumbling Blog: Is globalization to blame? Donald Trump’s victory is being seen as a backlash against globalization. For me, this poses the question: to what extent is globalization to blame for the decline in many workers’ real incomes? The answer, I suspect, is: not much. These papers by Ann Harrison and colleagues and Jonathan Haskel and colleagues show that it is very hard to link declining US real wages to increased openness to trade. Equally, it is unproven (to say the least) whether increased immigration has contributed to falling wages: George Borjas’s claim that it is has has been sharply challenged.

Binyamin Appelbaum, NYT: A Little-Noticed Fact About Trade: It’s No Longer Rising. The growth of trade among nations is among the most consequential and controversial economic developments of recent decades. Yet despite the noisy debates, which have reached new heights during this presidential campaign, it is a little-noticed fact that trade is no longer rising. The volume of global trade was flat in the first quarter of 2016, then fell by 0.8 percent in the second quarter, according to statisticians in the Netherlands, which happens to keep the best data.

Arthur Turrell, BoE: Power and progress. Energy is the fundamental currency of the physical world, while GDP is the imperfect catch-all measure of economic progress. Across countries, electricity and GDP are very strongly correlated. But which way does the causality go? Studies have found evidence for GDP causing electricity generation, electricity generation causing GDP and for a bi-directional relationship.  For the UK, the evidence suggests that it is a bi-directional dependence, based on a bootstrapped Granger causality test. Given over 85% of the world’s primary energy consumption comes from fossil fuels, countries around the world are either going to have to find new ways to produce power or break the link between GDP and electricity – whichever direction the causality runs.

Tim Gohmann, behavioraleconomics.com: How Donald Trump Won the Election: A Behavioral Economics Explanation. Trump’s campaign execution was a simple yet elegant display of behavioral economics in practice as follows: 1. IDENTIFICATION — make such disparaging remarks about minorities that the core target “see themselves” in the candidate; 2. UTILITY — communicate the most motivating expected campaign result to the core target — a restoration of the value of their labor (and financial status), the cornerstone to making America great again; and 3. LOSS AVERSION — motivate the core target by suggesting that this was their only chance to recover their social and financial status, thereby empowering them to turn out in such record numbers that the opposition was overwhelmed.

NOVEMBER 10 2016

Paul Krugman, NYT: The Economic Fallout. It really does now look like President Trump, and markets are plunging. When might we expect them to recover? Frankly, I find it hard to care much, even though this is my specialty. The disaster for America and the world has so many aspects that the economic ramifications are way down my list of things to fear. Still, I guess people want an answer: if the question is when markets will recover, a first-pass answer is never.

Lawrence H. Summers, Harvard University: Voters sour on traditional economic policy. It can hardly come as a great surprise that when economic growth falls short year after year and when its beneficiaries are a small subset of the population, electorates turn surly. They lose confidence in traditional policy approaches and their advocates. Looking back at the political traumas of 1968 when there were people in the streets in many countries, it is clear that there was something going on beyond specific issues like Vietnam in the US. In the same way as with Brexit, the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, the strength of rightwing nationalists in many European countries, Vladimir Putin’s strength in Russia and the return of Mao worship in China, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the world is seeing a renaissance of populist authoritarianism. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the world is seeing a renaissance of populist authoritarianism.

José Cuesta, Mario Negre, Christoph Lakner, VOX: Know your facts: Poverty numbers. The percentage of people living in extreme poverty around the world has fallen by more than half over the past three decades. But polls show that most people are not only ignorant of this fact, but believe that poverty has increased. This column explores progress towards ending global poverty by 2030, the first of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Poverty figures have fallen around the world since 1990, and there is a broad consensus on the policies needed for further reductions. Eradicating global poverty is achievable, but it is dependent on global and domestic political cooperation.

Nancy Cartwright, Angus Deaton, VOX: The limitations of randomised controlled trials. In recent years, the use of randomised controlled trials has spread from labour market and welfare programme evaluation to other areas of economics, and to other social sciences, perhaps most prominently in development and health economics. This column argues that some of the popularity of such trials rests on misunderstandings about what they are capable of accomplishing, and cautions against simple extrapolations from trials to other contexts.

The National Infrastructure Commission, UK: Call for Evidence. The Commission is a permanent body that “will operate independently, at arm’s length from government, as an executive agency of HM Treasury”. NIC has been established to provide the government with impartial, expert advice on major long-term infrastructure challenges. The Commission is launching a 15 week call for evidence to provide input into the development of its National Infrastructure Assessment. The Commission has identified 28 key questions which it believes will be important to answer in order to understand the main infrastructure challenges facing the country over the coming decades.

Patrick Bennett, Amine Ouazad, VOX: The relationship between job displacement and crime. A substantial body of literature finds significant effects of unemployment rates on crime rates. However, relatively little is known about the direct impact of individual unemployment on individual crime. This column examines the effect of job displacement on crime using 15 years of Danish administrative data. Being subject to a sudden and unexpected mass-layoff is found to increase the probability that an individual commits a crime. However, the findings stress the importance of policies targeting education and income inequality in mitigating crime.

NOVEMBER 3 2016

Ángel Ubide, VOX: The case for an active fiscal policy. The pre-crisis consensus was, and remains, very strong – the business cycle would be managed by monetary policy, while fiscal policy would focus solely on debt sustainability. In a world of zero interest rates, however, fiscal policy has to contribute to supporting aggregate demand and protecting against deflationary risks. This column outlines three ways in which a well-designed expansionary fiscal policy stance can contribute to better economic outcomes.

Stephen Redding, David Weinstein, VOX: What big data tells us about real income growth. Big data stands to transform economic measurement in substantial ways. The volume and precision of data available allows economists to revisit the foundational assumptions underpinning common indexes. This column presents a new empirical methodology that leverages big data to translate nominal numbers into real output or welfare. ‘The unified approach’ nests major price indexes and addresses implicit biases in these measures. An examination with barcode data suggests that standard methods of measuring welfare overstate cost of living increases by ignoring new products and demand shifts.

Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, Ulrich Zierahn, OECD: The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries. A Comparative Analysis. In recent years, there has been a revival of concerns that automation and digitalisation might after all result in a jobless future. These studies follow an occupation-based approach proposed by Frey and Osborne (2013), i.e. they assume that whole occupations rather than single job-tasks are automated by technology. We estimate the job automatibility of jobs for 21 OECD countries based on a task-based approach. In contrast to other studies, we take into account the heterogeneity of workers’ tasks within occupations. Overall, we find that, on average across the 21 OECD countries, 9 % of jobs are automatable. The threat from technological advances thus seems much less pronounced compared to the occupation-based approach. We further find heterogeneities across OECD countries. For instance, while the share of automatable jobs is 6 % in Korea, the corresponding share is 12 % in Austria. Differences between countries may reflect general differences in workplace organisation, differences in previous investments into automation technologies as well as differences in the education of workers across countries.

OECD Statistics Directorate: Statistical Insights: What does GDP per capita tell us about households’ material well-being? The preferred measure of people’s material well-being is household disposable income per capita, which represents the maximum amount a household can consume without having to reduce its assets or to increase its liabilities. The above-mentioned factors can create significant differences between measures of household disposable income per capita and GDP per capita. The United States for example see its position relative to the OECD average jump by more than 10 percentage points. On the other hand, Norway falls from 1st on a GDP basis to 4th on a household disposable income basis while Ireland drops dramatically. Switzerland also sees falls in its household income vs GDP ranking, partly because of the relatively large number of cross-border workers.

Manudeep Bhuller, Gordon B. Dahl, Katrine V. Løken, Magne Mogstad, University of Chicago: Incarceration, Recidivism and Employment. We construct a panel dataset containing the criminal behavior and labor market outcomes of the entire population, and exploit the random assignment of criminal cases to judges who differ systematically in their stringency in sentencing defendants to prison. Using judge stringency as an instrumental variable, we find that imprisonment discourages further criminal behavior, and that the reduction extends beyond incapacitation. Incarceration decreases the probability an individual will reoffend within 5 years by 27 percentage points, and reduces the number of offenses over this same period by 10 criminal charges. In comparison, OLS shows positive associations between incarceration and subsequent criminal behavior. This sharp contrast suggests the high rates of recidivism among ex-convicts is due to selection, and not a consequence of the experience of being in prison. Exploring factors that may explain the preventive effect of incarceration, we find the decline in crime is driven by individuals who were not working prior to incarceration. Contrary to the widely embraced ‘nothing works’ doctrine, these findings demonstrate that time spent in prison with a focus on rehabilitation can indeed be preventive.

Robert J. Shiller, Times: What’s Behind a Rise in Ethnic Nationalism? Maybe the Economy. It is natural to ask whether something so broad might have a common cause, other than the obvious circumstantial causes like the gradual fading of memories about the horrors of ethnic conflict in World War II or the rise in this century of forms of violent ethnic terrorism. Economics is my specialty, and I think economic factors may explain at least part of the trend.

Pascal Mittermaier, Project Syndicate: How Trees Make Cities Healthier. Heat waves account for more deaths than any other type of weather-related event, killing more than 12,000 people worldwide each year. Making matters worse, cities tend to have higher rates of air pollution, especially fine particulate matter (PM) resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels and biomass, which contributes to up to three million deaths every year. Fortunately, there is a simple step that municipal leaders can take to reduce both extreme heat and air pollution: plant more trees.

OCTOBER 27 2016

John Fernald, FED San Francisco: What Is the New Normal for U.S. Growth? Estimates suggest the new normal for U.S. GDP growth has dropped to between 1½ and 1¾%, noticeably slower than the typical postwar pace. The slowdown stems mainly from demographics and educational attainment. As baby boomers retire, employment growth shrinks. And educational attainment of the workforce has plateaued, reducing its contribution to productivity growth through labor quality. The GDP growth forecast assumes that, apart from these effects, the modest productivity growth is relatively “normal”—in line with its pace for most of the period since 1973.

Adam Chandler, The Atlantic: Why Do Americans Move So Much More Than Europeans? Decades of data, including a more recent Gallup study, characterizes the United States as one of the most geographically mobile countries in the world. According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the average person in the United States moves residences more than 11 times in his or her lifetime. According to a survey conducted by the real-estate company Re/Max earlier this year, that figure across 16 European countries is roughly four. More than half of interstate migrants said they moved for employment-related reasons. Workers in the U.S. now “put in almost 25 percent more hours than Europeans” in a given year. Fatih Karahan and Darius Li at the New York Fed are the latest to note that U.S. workers are moving around less than before. Karahan and Li put much stock in the effects of an aging workforce, to which they attribute “at least half” of the decline in interstate migration.

Caroline M. Hoxby, NBER: The Dramatic Economics  of the U.S. Market  for Higher Education. I show the productivity of institutions across this market. Strikingly, among institutions that experience strong market forces, the productivity of a dollar of educational resources is fairly similar, even if the schools serve students with substantially different CR. On the other hand, among institutions that experience weak market forces, productivity is lower and more dispersed. These facts suggest that market forces are needed to keep schools productive and to allocate resources across schools in a way that assures that the marginal return to additional resources at different institutions is roughly comparable.

Richard Susskind, Daniel Susskind, Harvard Business Review: Robots Will Replace Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals. Most mainstream professionals — doctors, lawyers, accountants, and so on — believe they will emerge largely unscathed. During our consulting work and at conferences, we regularly hear practitioners concede that routine work can be taken on by machines, but they maintain that human experts will always be needed for the tricky stuff that calls for judgment, creativity, and empathy. Our research and analysis challenges the idea that these professionals will be spared. We expect that within decades the traditional professions will be dismantled, leaving most, but not all, professionals to be replaced by less-expert people, new types of experts, and high-performing systems.

Hansen, Bertel Teilfeldt et al, Epidemiology: The consequences of daylight savings time transitions on the incidence rate of unipolar depressive episodes. Daylight savings time (DST) transitions affect approximately 1.6 billion people worldwide. Prior studies have documented associations between DST transitions and adverse health outcomes. Using time series intervention analysis of nationwide data from the Danish Psychiatric Central Research Register from 1995 to 2012 we compared the observed trend in the incidence rate of hospital contacts for unipolar depressive episodes after the transitions to and from summer time to the predicted trend in the incidence rate. The analyses were based on 185.419 hospital contacts for unipolar depression and showed that the transition from summer time to standard time led to an 11 percent increase (95% CI: 7, 15%) in the incidence rate of hospital contacts for unipolar depressive episodes that dissipated over approximately 10 weeks.

Austin C. Smith, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics: Spring Forward at Your Own Risk: Daylight Saving Time and Fatal Vehicle Crashes. Daylight Saving Time (DST) impacts over 1.5 billion people, yet many of its impacts on practicing populations remain uncertain. Exploiting the discrete nature of DST transitions and a 2007 policy change, I estimate the impact of DST on fatal automobile crashes. My results imply that from 2002–2011 the transition into DST caused over 30 deaths at a social cost of $275 million annually. Employing four tests to decompose the aggregate effect into an ambient light or sleep mechanism, I find that shifting ambient light only reallocates fatalities within a day, while sleep deprivation caused by the spring transition increases risk.

Havranek, Tomas, Herman, Dominik, Irsova, Zuzana, MPRA: Does Daylight Saving Save Energy? A Meta-Analysis. The original rationale for adopting daylight saving time (DST) was energy savings. Modern research studies, however, question the magnitude and even direction of the effect of DST on energy consumption. Representing the first meta-analysis in this literature, we collect 162 estimates from 44 studies and find that the mean reported estimate indicates modest energy savings: 0.34% during the days when DST applies. Energy savings are larger for countries farther away from the equator, while subtropical regions consume more energy because of DST.

Jochen Bittner, NYT: What Do Trump and Marx Have in Common? We have a word in German, “Wutbürger,” which means “angry citizen”. Wutbürgers lie at both ends of the political spectrum. A Wutbürger rages against a new train station and tilts against wind turbines. Many British Wutbürgers voted for Brexit. French Wutbürgers will vote for Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Perhaps the most powerful Wutbürger of them all is Donald J. Trump. Which raises the question: How was anger hijacked? Karl Marx was a Wutbürger. The upper class has gained much more from the internationalization of trade and finances than the working class has, often in obscene ways. We live in a world, the liberal British historian Timothy Garton Ash noted lately, “which would have Marx rubbing his hands with Schadenfreude.” In Germany a recent poll showed that only 14 percent of the citizens trusted the politicians.

OCTOBER 20 2016

Etienne Gagnon, Benjamin K. Johannsen, David Lopez-Salido, FED: Understanding the New Normal: The Role of Demographics. Since the Great Recession, the U.S. economy has experienced low real GDP growth and low real interest rates, including for long maturities. We show that these developments were largely predictable by calibrating an overlapping-generation model with a rich demographic structure to observed and projected changes in U.S. population, family composition, life expectancy, and labor market activity. The model accounts for a 1¼{percentage-point decline in both real GDP growth and the equilibrium real interest rate since 1980|essentially all of the permanent declines in those variables according to some estimates. The model also implies that these declines were especially pronounced over the past decade or so because of demographic factors most-directly associated with the post-war baby boom and the passing of the information technology boom. Our results further suggest that real GDP growth and real interest rates will remain low in coming decades, consistent with the U.S. economy having reached a “new normal."

Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University: Where Have All the Workers Gone? The labor force participation rate in the U.S. has declined since 2007 primarily because of population aging and ongoing trends that preceded the recession. The participation rate has evolved differently, and for different reasons, across demographic groups. A rise in school enrollment has largely offset declining participation for young workers since the 1990s. Participation in the labor force has been declining for prime age men for decades, and about half of prime age men who are not in the labor force (NLF) may have a serious health condition that is a barrier to work. Nearly half of prime age NLF men take pain medication on a daily basis, and in nearly two-thirds of cases they take prescription pain medication. The labor force participation rate has stopped rising for cohorts of women born after 1960. Prime age men who are out of the labor force report that they experience notably low levels of emotional well-being throughout their days and that they derive relatively little meaning from their daily activities.

The Economist: The superstar company. A giant problem. There are some worrying similarities to a much earlier era. In 1860-1917 the global economy was reshaped by the rise of giant new industries (steel and oil) and revolutionary new technologies (electricity and the combustion engine). These disruptions led to brief bursts of competition followed by prolonged periods of oligopoly. The business titans of that age reinforced their positions by driving their competitors out of business and cultivating close relations with politicians. The backlash that followed helped to destroy the liberal order in much of Europe. So, by all means celebrate the astonishing achievements of today’s superstar companies. But also watch them. The world needs a healthy dose of competition to keep today’s giants on their toes and to give those in their shadow a chance to grow.

Peter Coy, Businessweek: How to Raise the Retirement Age for People Who Want to Work. Most Americans are healthy enough to work longer than they actually do. The economists look at the health of those men and what share of them is working and compare them with men at older ages. The study finds that health declines slowly with age, but work declines rapidly. The pattern is the same for women. Poor health, in other words, isn't what's pushing most people into retirement. Unfortunately, there's no way to raise the retirement age that's problem-free.

Jennifer Doleac, Benjamin Hansen, TIME: How Hiding Criminal Records Hurts Black and Hispanic Men. If we want to reduce incarceration rates, we must help ex-offenders build stable lives outside prison walls. One common method is to “Ban The Box,” which amounts to preventing employers from asking about applicants’ criminal records until late in the application process. (The policy gets its name from the box that applicants are asked to check if they’ve been convicted of a crime.) This seems like a good idea. But recent evidence suggests that BTB laws do more harm than good. They actually decrease employment for young, low-skilled black and Hispanic men overall, a group that already struggles to get work even when they have committed no crime.

Carl Gornitzki, Agne Larsson, Bengt Fadeel, BMJ: Freewheelin’ scientists: citing Bob Dylan in the biomedical literature. In September 2014 it emerged that a group of scientists at the Karolinska Institute in Sweden had been sneaking the lyrics of Bob Dylan into their papers as part of a long running bet. Was this Dylan citing unique to the Karolinska Institute? A 2015 analysis published in The BMJ found 727 potential references to Dylan songs in a search of the Medline biomedical journals database; the authors ultimately concluded that 213 of the references could be “classified as unequivocally citing Dylan.” The earliest article the authors identified appeared in 1970 in The Journal of Practical Nursing. The title? “The Times They Are a-Changin’.

OCTOBER 6 2016

Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned From The Crisis? The crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have taken place in an environment in which conservative ideology retains a powerful position in real-world politics and the academy alike. So relatively few economists or policymakers have been willing to reconsider their views despite overwhelming empirical refutation. Or to put it another way, one thing we seem to have learned from the crisis is that many of our colleagues are less engaged in something like science, an attempt to understand the world as it is, than we would like to think. Instead, when they invoke evidence it’s the way a drunkard uses a lamppost: for support, not illumination. The best excuse one can offer is that even hard scientists are often reluctant to change their views – “Science progresses one funeral at a time,” said Max Planck. But what I’m pointing out here isn’t just that too few economists were willing to learn from the Great Recession, but that there’s a notable contrast with the way the profession seized on the troubles of the 1970s. This asymmetry is what’s troubling, and suggests that politics and ideology have distorted our field.

Kenneth Rogoff, Project Syndicate: Is the Fed Playing Politics? In his recent debate with his opponent Hillary Clinton, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump pressed his claim that US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen is politically motivated. The Fed, Trump claims, is applying overdoses of monetary stimulus to hypnotize voters into believing that economic recovery is underway. It’s not a completely crazy idea, but I just don’t see it. If Yellen is so determined to keep interest rates in a deep freeze, why has she been trying in recent months to talk up longer-term rates by insisting that the Fed is likely to hike rates faster than the market currently believes?

Larry Summers, FT: Men Without Work. Job destruction caused by technology is not a futuristic concern.  It is something we have been living with for two generations.  A simple linear trend suggests that by mid-century about a quarter of men between 25 and 54 will not be working at any moment. I think this is likely a substantial underestimate unless something is done for a number of reasons.  First everything we hear and see regarding technology suggests the rate of job destruction will pick up.  Think of the elimination of drivers, and of those who work behind cash registers.  Second, the gains in average education and health of the workforce over the last 50 years are unlikely to be repeated.  Third, to the extent that non-work is contagious, it is likely to grow exponentially rather than at a linear rate.  Fourth, declining marriage rates are likely to raise rates of labor force withdrawal given that non-work is much more common for unmarried than married men.

Katharine G. Abraham el al. NBERT: The Consequences of Long Term Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data. It is well known that the long-term unemployed fare worse in the labor market than the short-term unemployed, but less clear why this is so. The rich information on work histories provided by the wage records allows us to control for individual heterogeneity that could be affecting post-unemployment labor market outcomes. Even with these controls in place, we find that unemployment duration has a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of subsequent employment. This finding is inconsistent with the “bad apple” (heterogeneity) explanation for why the long-term unemployed fare worse than the short-term unemployed. We also find that longer unemployment durations are associated with lower subsequent earnings, though this is mainly attributable to the long-term unemployed having a lower likelihood of subsequent employment rather than to their having lower earnings once a job is found.

Ali Alichi, Kory Kantenga, Juan Solé, IMF: Income Polarization in the United States. Since the turn of the current century, most of polarization has been towards lower incomes. This result is striking and in contrast with findings of other recent contributions. In addition, the paper finds evidence that, after conditioning on income and household characteristics, the marginal propensity to consume from permanent changes in income has somewhat fallen in recent years. We assess the potential impacts of these trends on private consumption. During 1998-2013, the rise in income polarization and lower marginal propensity to consume have suppressed the level of real consumption at the aggregate level, by about 3½ percent—equivalent to more than one year of consumption

Bruce Bower, Science News: Big Viking families nurtured murder. Murder was a calculated family affair among Iceland’s early Viking settlers. And the bigger the family, the more bloodthirsty. Data from three family histories spanning six generations support the idea that disparities in family size have long influenced who killed whom in small-scale societies. These epic written stories, or sagas, record everything from births and marriages to deals and feuds. Iceland’s Viking killers had on average of nearly three times as many biological relatives and in-laws as their victims did, says a team led by evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar of the University of Oxford. Prolific killers responsible for five or more murders had the greatest advantage in kin numbers.

SEPTEMBER 29 2016

Ben Bernanke, Brookings: Modifying the Fed’s policy framework: Does a higher inflation target beat negative interest rates? It would be extremely helpful if central banks could count on other policymakers, particularly fiscal policymakers, to take on some of the burden of stabilizing the economy during the next recession. Since that can’t be assured, and since the current low-interest-rate environment may persist, there are good reasons for the Fed and other central bankers to consider changes in their policy frameworks. The option of raising the inflation target should be part of that discussion. But, as I have argued in this post, it is premature to rule out alternative or potentially complementary approaches, including the possibility of using negative interest rates.

Larry Summers, FT: Building the case for greater infrastructure investment. The case for infrastructure investment has been strong for a long time, but it gets stronger with each passing year, as government borrowing costs decline and ongoing neglect raises the return on incremental spending increases. As it becomes clearer that growth will not return to pre-financial-crisis levels on its own, the urgency of policy action rises. Just as the infrastructure failure at Chernobyl was a sign of malaise in the Soviet Union’s last years, profound questions about America’s future are raised by collapsing bridges, children losing IQ points because of lead in water and an air traffic control system that does not use GPS technology.

 

John Lewis, BoE: Robot Macroeconomics: What can theory and several centuries of economic history teach us? On the plus side, if you are worried about secular stagnation then robots offer you a couple of reasons to be cheerful.   First up, if robotisation does constitute a major productivity gain that raises the marginal productivity of capital, then this should push up on long run-equilibrium real rates, and hence ease fears of secular stagnation.  Second, whilst economic theory usually assumes that technological growth means capital is just costlessly melted down and made into newer, more productive machines, in practice, some innovations might require scrapping of old capital, and hence a wave of new investment.

Robert Rich, Joseph Tracy, Ellen Fu; NY FED: U.S. Real Wage Growth: Slowing Down With Age. Life-cycle pattern of real wage growth is characterized by high growth early in a worker’s career, little to no growth in mid-career, and negative growth as workers near retirement. A growing fraction of the U.S. adult population is transitioning into the flat to negative real wage growth phases of their careers. Here, we turn our attention to estimating the effect of this demographic shift on the economy-wide average real wage growth rate. Our analysis shows that this economy-wide average real wage growth rate has declined by a third since the mid-1980s.

The National Academies of Science: The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. The number of immigrants living in the United States increased by more than 70 percent—from 24.5 million (about 9 percent of the population) in 1995 to 42.3 million (about 13 percent of the population) in 2014. One set of headline questions concerns the economy, specifically jobs and wages. Other questions arise about taxes and public spending. The literature on employment impacts finds little evidence that immigration significantly affects the overall employment levels of native-born workers. However, recent research finds that immigration reduces the number of hours worked by native teens. There is some evidence that recent immigrants reduce the employment rate of prior immigrants. Cross-sectional data from 1994-2013 reveal that, at any given age, the net fiscal contribution of adults in the first generation (and not including costs or benefits generated by their dependents) was on average consistently less favorable than that of the second and third-plus generations. Viewed over a long time horizon (75 years in our estimates), the fiscal impacts of immigrants are generally positive at the federal level and negative at the state and local levels.

Robert J. Shiller, NYT: Today’s Inequality Could Easily Become Tomorrow’s Catastrophe.  Truly extreme gaps in income and wealth could arise from many causes. Consider just a few: Innovations in robotics and artificial intelligence, which are already making many jobs uncompetitive, could lead us into a world in which basic work with decent pay becomes impossible to find. An environmental disaster like global warming, pollution or disease could sharply reduce the ability of people of ordinary means to live in specific regions or entire countries.

The Economist: Post-truth politics. Art of the lie. That politicians sometimes peddle lies is not news. But post-truth politics is more than just an invention of whingeing elites who have been outflanked. The term picks out the heart of what is new: that truth is not falsified, or contested, but of secondary importance. Once, the purpose of political lying was to create a false view of the world. The lies of men like Mr Trump do not work like that. They are not intended to convince the elites, whom their target voters neither trust nor like, but to reinforce prejudices. Feelings, not facts, are what matter in this sort of campaigning.

Daily Mail: The police dog that can sniff out child porn. Dog named Ruger can detect a chemical found on flash drives or SD cards. This allows him to sniff out stashes of electronics to bust pedophiles. The dogs are trained by isolating the odor specific to these devices. Soon, he will join the K9 unit to sniff out pedophiles for the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.

SEPTEMBER 15 2015

Martin Wolf, FT: Monetary policy in a low-rate world. The first concerns what to do now. Above, I assumed that rates will have risen substantially, before the next recession. Yet this is far more likely if the economy is allowed to build up a substantial head of steam. Premature rises in interest rates might trigger a sharper slowdown than people expect and put central banks in the worst possible situation: tackling recession when rates remain extremely low. For this reason, as Fed governor Lael Brainard argues, “the costs to the economy of greater-than-expected strength in demand are likely to be lower than the costs of significant unexpected weakness”. The riskier policy is tightening policy too soon, not too late (Vi är många som inte har tillgång till ledande internationella tidningar, inte ens på jobbet, här ett tips: Kopiera titeln och sök i Google, klicka länken och ofta kan artikeln läsas utanför ”paywall”).

Robert J. Samuelson, Washington Post: Are aging and the economic slowdown linked? An aging United States reduces the economy’s growth — big time. That’s the startling conclusion of a new academic study, and if it withstands scholarly scrutiny, it could transform our national political and economic debate. We’ve known for decades, of course, that the retirement of the huge baby-boom generation — coupled with low birthrates — would make the United States an older society. But the study goes a giant step further, claiming that the very fact that the United States is an aging society weakens economic growth. “The fraction of the United States population age 60 or over will increase by 21 percent between 2010 and 2020,” says the study.

George J. Borjas, Joan Monras, Harvard: The Labor Market Consequences of Refugee Supply Shocks. This paper revisits four historical refugee shocks to document their labor market impact. We use a common empirical approach, derived from factor demand theory, and publicly available data to measure the impact of these shocks. Despite the differences in the political forces that motivated the various flows, and in economic conditions across receiving countries, the evidence reveals a common thread that confirms key insights of the canonical model of a competitive labor market: Exogenous supply shocks adversely affect the labor market opportunities of competing natives in the receiving countries, and often have a favorable impact on complementary workers. In short, refugee flows can have large distributional consequences.

Neil Irwin, NYT: The Economic Expansion Is Helping the Middle Class, Finally. For years, the standard knock on this economic expansion has been twofold: Growth has been slow, and big businesses and wealthy investors have been its major beneficiaries, rather than middle-class wage earners. And it has been a fair criticism. At least until recently. The most decisive evidence of improving fortunes is found in new census data released Tuesday showing that median household income rose a whopping 5.2 percent in 2015, to around $56,500. According to that data, incomes rose for black families, white families, Hispanic families and Asian-American families. It rose for young people and in households headed by middle-aged adults and older people. In short, the improvement was across the board to a remarkable degree.

Peter Cohen, Robert Hahn, Jonathan Hall, Steven Levitt, Robert Metcalfe, NBER: Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber. Estimating consumer surplus is challenging because it requires identification of the entire demand curve. We rely on Uber’s “surge” pricing algorithm and the richness of its individual level data to first estimate demand elasticities at several points along the demand curve. We then use these elasticity estimates to estimate consumer surplus. Using almost 50 million individual-level observations and a regression discontinuity design, we estimate that in 2015 the UberX service generated about $2.9 billion in consumer surplus in the four U.S. cities included in our analysis. For each dollar spent by consumers, about $1.60 of consumer surplus is generated. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the overall consumer surplus generated by the UberX service in the United States in 2015 was $6.8 billion.

Robert H. Frank, The Atlantic: Why Luck Matters More Than You Might Think. I have discovered that chance plays a far larger role in life outcomes than most people realize. And yet, the luckiest among us appear especially unlikely to appreciate our good fortune. People in higher income brackets are much more likely than those with lower incomes to say that individuals get rich primarily because they work hard. Other surveys bear this out: Wealthy people overwhelmingly attribute their own success to hard work rather than to factors like luck or being in the right place at the right time. When people see themselves as self-made, they tend to be less generous and public-spirited.

Stijn Baert, Simon Amez, IZA: No Better Moment to Score a Goal than Just Before Half Time? A Soccer Myth Statistically Tested. We test the soccer myth suggesting that a particularly good moment to score a goal is just before half time. To this end, rich data on 1,179 games played in the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League are analysed. In contrast to the myth, we find that, conditional on the goal difference and other game characteristics at half time, the final goal difference at the advantage of the home team is 0.520 goals lower in case of a goal just before half time by this team. We show that this finding relates to this team's lower probability of scoring a goal during the second half.

SEPTEMBER 8 2016

Michael Spence, Project Syndicate: How to Fight Secular Stagnation. Much of the world, especially the advanced economies, has been mired in a pattern of slow and declining GDP growth in recent years, causing many to wonder whether this is becoming a semi-permanent condition – so-called “secular stagnation.” The answer is probably yes, but the question lacks precision, and thus has limited utility. There are, after all, different types of forces that could be suppressing growth, not all of which are beyond our control.

Antonio Fatás, Lawrence H. Summers, NBER:The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations. The global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of GDP in all advanced economies. At the same time, and in response to rising government debt levels, many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates. We empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regarding fiscal policy multipliers. Our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy. The large size of the effects points in the direction of self-defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by DeLong and Summers (2012). Attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to GDP ratio through their long-term negative impact on output.

Thorvaldur Gylfason, VOX: Economic performance in two dimensions: How Europe beats the US. One-dimensional indicators such as GNI per capita are known to be flawed measures of wellbeing. The Human Development Index (HDI) introduced dimensions of health and education alongside income. This column argues that an HDI adjusted for inequality and hours worked gives deeper insight into a country's economic standing. Using this composite measure, the US falls from first to seventh among G8 countries.

Eric D. Gould, Alexander Hijzen, IMF: Growing Apart, Losing Trust? The Impact of Inequality on Social Capital. There is a widespread perception that trust and social capital have declined in United States as well as other advanced economies, while income inequality has tended to increase. While previous research has noted that measured trust declines as individuals become less similar to one another, this paper examines whether the downward trend in social capital is responding to the increasing gaps in income. The analysis uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) for the United States, and the European Social Survey (ESS) for Europe. The results provide robust evidence that overall inequality lowers an individual’s sense of trust in others in the United States as well as in other advanced economies. These effects mainly stem from residual inequality, which may be more closely associated with the notion of fairness, as well as inequality in the bottom of the distribution. Since trust has been linked to economic growth and development in the existing literature, these findings suggest an important, indirect way through which inequality affects macro-economic performance.

Seth Gershenson, Michael S. Hayes, IZA: Short-Run Externalities of Civic Unrest: Evidence from Ferguson, Missouri. We document externalities of the civic unrest experienced in Ferguson, MO following the police shooting of an unarmed black teenager. Difference-in-differences and synthetic control method estimates compare Ferguson-area schools to neighboring schools in the greater St. Louis area and find that the unrest led to statistically significant, arguably causal declines in students' math and reading achievement. Attendance is one mechanism through which this effect operated, as chronic absence increased by five percent in Ferguson-area schools. Impacts were concentrated in elementary schools and at the bottom of the achievement distribution and spilled over into majority black schools throughout the area.

Noah Smith, Bloomberg: Data Geeks Are Taking Over Economics. So in recent years, many economists have been turning to an alternative approach and chucking theory out the window entirely. Instead of a complicated model about optimization and utility functions and blah blah blah, just look for a case where some kind of random change in the economy -- a so-called natural experiment -- offers a window into some important question. For example, you could study a random influx of refugees to answer the question of how immigration affects local labor markets. You don’t need a complicated theory of how workers and companies behave -- all you need is a simple linear model of how X affects Y. And so far, the revolution is winning. As economists Matthew Panhans and John Singleton document in a recent paper, quasi-experimental techniques are an increasingly large piece of academic publishing.

SEPTEMBER 2 2016

Shekhar Aiyar, Christian Ebeke, Xiaobo Shao, IMF: The Euro Area Workforce is Aging, Costing Growth. The euro area’s population is expected to grow significantly older over the next couple of decades. This has two components. First, the number of retirees is set to grow compared to the people of working age (15–64) in the region. Second, and much less examined, the average age of people within the labor force will rise: the share of workers aged 55–64 is forecast to increase by a third, from 15 percent to 20 percent, over the next two decades. Aging will take a considerable toll on productivity growth over the medium- to long-term. Average total factor productivity growth in the euro area is forecast to be around 0.8 percent per year. This could be higher by a quarter—that is to say, total factor productivity could increase to about one percent per year—if we shut down the effect of workforce aging. The burden of workforce aging will fall unequally across euro area member states. Worryingly, some of the largest adverse effects on productivity will fall on countries that can least afford it, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

David Halpern, BoE: It’s time to bring more realistic models of human behaviour into economic policy and regulation. Behaviour science has had major impacts on policy in recent years. Introducing a more realistic model of human behaviour – to replace the ‘rational’ utility-maximizer – has enabled policymakers to boost savings; increase tax payments; encourage healthier choices; reduce energy consumption; boost educational attendance; reduce crime; and increase charitable giving. But there remain important areas where its potential has yet to be realised, including macroeconomic policy and large areas of regulatory practice. Businesses, consumers, and even regulators are subject to similar systematic biases to other humans. These include overconfidence; being overly influenced by what others are doing; and being influenced by irrelevant information. The good news is that behavioural science offers the prospect of helping regulators address some of their most pressing issues. This includes: anticipating and addressing ‘animal spirits’ that drive bubbles or sentiment-driven slowdowns; reducing corrupt market practices; and encouraging financial products that are comprehensible to humans.

Rasmus Landersø, James J. Heckman, NBER: The Scandinavian Fantasy: The Sources of Intergenerational Mobility in Denmark and the U.S. This paper examines the sources of differences in social mobility between the U.S. and Denmark. Measured by income mobility, Denmark is a more mobile society, but not when measured by educational mobility. There are pronounced nonlinearities in income and educational mobility in both countries. Greater Danish income mobility is largely a consequence of redistributional tax, transfer, and wage compression policies. While Danish social policies for children produce more favorable cognitive test scores for disadvantaged children, these do not translate into more favorable educational outcomes, partly because of disincentives to acquire education arising from the redistributional policies that increase income mobility.

Jeff Gou, Washington Post: The clearest proof yet that your job is killing you. For decades now, the modern worker has been urged to slow down, chill out, de-stress. Doctors link long shifts and on-the-job anxiety to high blood pressure, heart disease, depression and stroke. Yet, so far, the connection between job strain and bad health has mostly been correlational. Recently, economists at Purdue and the University of Copenhagen made a clever attempt to clear up the question. They looked at Danish manufacturing companies where overseas sales increased unexpectedly because of changes in foreign demand or transportation costs between 1996 and 2006. These constituted a set of natural experiments. At firms where exports spiked, there was suddenly a lot more work to do, a lot more things to sell. Researchers found that women at companies where there was an export boom were subsequently more likely to be treated for severe depression, and more likely to take prescription medication for heart attack or stroke. For both men and women, there was also an increase in severe on-the-job injuries.

Roland G. Fryer, Jr, NBER: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force. This paper explores racial differences in police use of force. On non-lethal uses of force, blacks and Hispanics are more than fifty percent more likely to experience some form of force in interactions with police. Adding controls that account for important context and civilian behavior reduces, but cannot fully explain, these disparities. On the most extreme use of force – officer-involved shootings – we find no racial differences in either the raw data or when contextual factors are taken into account. We argue that the patterns in the data are consistent with a model in which police officers are utility maximizers, a fraction of which have a preference for discrimination, who incur relatively high expected costs of officer-involved shootings.

Bjorn Lomborg, US Today: Organic food is great business, but a bad investment. An organic label sends our skepticism and good sense out the window. Consumers in one study were given two sets of absolutely identical food items, with one set marked “organic” and one not. They declared the food they believed to be “organic” to be lower in calories and more nutritious, and were willing to pay 16% to 23% more. It’s called the “health halo” effect. Organic food has become the fastest-growing sector of the U.S. food industry, with sales that increase by double digits annually. But organics are not better for your health, worse for nature and the planet, and terrible for the world’s poor. What it boils down to is the world’s richest people spending their cash to support less efficient farming practices, to feel better about their choices.