Katie
Stratford, BoE: Why has world trade been so weak in recent years?
Before the
crisis world trade tended to grow around twice as quickly as world GDP, but
since 2012 trade growth has simply matched that of GDP. So what explains this weakness? Contrary to some other economists, this post
finds no evidence that factors such as slowing growth of supply chains or the
expenditure split of demand can explain the weakness relative to GDP. Instead, it is due to the changing
composition of global activity: over time a greater share of world activity has
been accounted for by countries whose imports grow more slowly relative to
GDP. These trends are likely to
continue, such that world trade is likely to grow more slowly relative to GDP
than in the past.
Larry
Summers, Washington Post: Where Paul Krugman and I differ on secular stagnation. I think we have both been focused on demand and the
liquidity trap for a long time. But there are two areas where I have had
somewhat different views from Paul. First, I believe that structural issues are
often important for demand and growth. I have often asserted that
"business confidence is the cheapest form of stimulus," and once
quoted to President Obama the famous 1938 letter by Keynes to Roosevelt. Second,
I have never related well to Paul’s celebrated liquidity trap analysis. It has
always seemed to me be a classic example of economists’ tendency to
"assume a can opener." Paul studies an economy in liquidity trap that
will, by deus ex machina, be lifted out at some point in the future. He makes
the point that if you assume sufficiently inflationary policy after this point,
you can drive ex ante real rates down enough to stimulate the economy even
before the deus ex machina moment.
Wolfgang
Frimmel, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, VOX: The contribution of the wage structure to
early retirement behavior.
The literature on retirement age has tended to focus on the supply side of the
labour market. Using Austrian data, this column examines how firms can
influence workers’ retirement decisions through wage structure. Deferred
compensations schemes characterised by steeper seniority-wage profiles are
found to be associated with workers retiring earlier. Given that early labour
market exit is associated with higher costs to social security systems,
policymakers could focus on creating incentives for firms to flatten wage
profiles.
Anek
Belbase, Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, Christopher M. Gillis (CRR): Does
Age-Related Decline in Ability Correspond with Retirement Age? While declines in physical and mental performance
are inevitable as workers age, they are not uniform across the various systems
of the body – some physical and cognitive abilities decline much earlier than
others. This variance implies that workers in occupations that rely on skills
that decline early may be unable to work until late ages. This paper finds that
a variety of white-collar occupations, such as police detective and designer,
are just as susceptible to declines in the abilities required for work as are
blue-collar occupations. The Susceptibility Index is a significant predictor of
early retirement; for example, workers in occupations in the 90th percentile of
the Index are 5.7 percentage points more likely to retire by age 65 than
workers in the 10th percentile.
Fatih
Karahan, NY FED: Understanding Earnings Dispersion. Drawing on a recent New York Fed staff report
"What Do Data on Millions of U.S. Workers Reveal about Life-Cycle Earnings
Risks?", this blog post investigates the nature of earnings inequality
over a lifetime. It finds that earnings
are subject to significant downside risk and that such risk contributes
substantially to overall earnings dispersion. Salary and wage data from 33
years of W-2 forms (more than 200 million observations) show how much earnings
inequality among men increases with age. The chart below plots the variance of
how much men earn from age twenty-five to sixty. While earnings are quite
dispersed among twenty-five-year-olds, dispersion increases dramatically over
the next thirty-five years.
George
J. Borjas, NBER: The Wage Impact of the
Marielitos: A
Reappraisal. This paper brings a new perspective to the analysis of the Mariel
supply shock, revisiting the question and the data armed with the accumulated
insights from the vast literature on the economic impact of immigration. A crucial lesson from this literature is that
any credible attempt to measure the wage impact of immigration must carefully
match the skills of the immigrants with those of the pre-existing
workforce. The Marielitos were
disproportionately low-skill; at least 60 percent were high school
dropouts. A reappraisal of the Mariel
evidence, specifically examining the evolution of wages in the low-skill group
most likely to be affected, quickly overturns the finding that Mariel did not
affect Miami's wage structure. The absolute
wage of high school dropouts in Miami dropped dramatically, as did the wage of
high school dropouts relative to that of either high school graduates or
college graduates. The drop in the
relative wage of the least educated Miamians was substantial (10 to 30
percent), implying an elasticity of wages with respect to the number of workers
between -0.5 and -1.5. In fact,
comparing the magnitude of the steep post-Mariel drop in the low-skill wage in
Miami with that observed in all other metropolitan areas over an equivalent
time span between 1977 and 2001 reveals that the change in the Miami wage
structure was a very unusual event.
Brad
Hershbein, Melissa S. Kearney and Lawrence H.Summers, Hamilton Project:
Increasing education: What it will and will not do for earnings and earnings
inequality. In this
analysis we have simulated the effects of increasing the college attainment of
working-age men to illustrate the likely effects on earnings and earnings
inequality. Our empirical simulation supports the following general
observations. Increasing the educational attainment of men without a college
degree will increase their average earnings and their likelihood of being
employed. Increasing educational attainment will not significantly change
overall earnings inequality. Increasing educational attainment will, however,
reduce inequality in the bottom half of the earnings distribution, largely by
pulling up the earnings of those near the 25th percentile
Christopher
J. Ruhm, VOX: Economic crises and mortality. Conventional wisdom tells us that health deteriorates
when the economy weakens and improves when it strengthens. Some research
tentatively agrees, but there is a marked dearth of challenges and robust
research. This column presents new evidence suggesting that the reductions in
mortality occurring during typical economic downturns also occur in periods of
crisis, adding useful caveats for different types of downturns and crises.
Larry
Summers blog: Advanced economies are so sick we need a new way to think about
them. Blanchard
Cerutti and I look at a sample of over 100 recessions from industrial countries
over the last 50 years and examine their impact on long run output levels in an
effort to understand what Blanchard and I had earlier called hysteresis
effects. We find that in the vast majority of cases output never returns to
previous trends. Indeed there appear to be more cases where recessions reduce
the subsequent growth of output than where output returns to trend. In other
words “super hysteresis” to use Larry Ball’s term is more frequent than “no
hysteresis.” Standard new Keynesian macroeconomics essentially abstracts away
from most of what is important in macroeconomics. To an even greater extent
this is true of the DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models that
are the workhorse of central bank staffs and much practically oriented academic
work.
Olivier
Blanchard, Raghuram Rajan, Kenneth Rogoff , Lawrence H. Summers, MIT Press:
Progress and Confusion. The State of Macroeconomic Policy. What will economic policy look like once the global
financial crisis is finally over? Will it resume the pre-crisis consensus, or
will it be forced to contend with a post-crisis “new normal”? Have we made
progress in addressing these issues, or does confusion remain? In April of
2015, the International Monetary Fund gathered leading economists, both
academics and policymakers, to address the shape of future macroeconomic
policy. This book is the result, with prominent figures—including Ben Bernanke,
Lawrence Summers, and Paul Volcker—offering essays that address topics that
range from the measurement of systemic risk to foreign exchange intervention.
The chapters address whether we have entered a “new normal” of low growth,
negative real rates, and deflationary pressures, with contributors taking
opposing views; whether new financial regulation has stemmed systemic risk; the
effectiveness of macro prudential tools; monetary policy, the choice of inflation
targets, and the responsibilities of central banks; fiscal policy, stimulus,
and debt stabilization; the volatility of capital flows; and the international
monetary and financial system, including the role of international policy
coordination. In light of these discussions, is there progress or confusion
regarding the future of macroeconomic policy? In the final chapter, volume
editor Olivier Blanchard answers: both. Many lessons have been learned; but, as
the chapters of the book reveal, there is no clear agreement on several key
issues.
Martin
Wolf, FT: America’s labour market is not working. In 2014, 12 per cent — close to one in eight — of US
men between the ages of 25 and 54 were neither in work nor looking for it. This
was very close to the Italian ratio and far higher than in other members of the
group of seven leading high-income countries: in the UK, it was 8 per cent; in
Germany and France 7 per cent; and in Japan a mere 4 per cent. In the same
year, the proportion of US prime-age women neither in work nor looking for it
was 26 per cent, much the same as in Japan and less only than Italy’s. US
labour market performance was strikingly poor for the men and women whose
responsibilities should make earning a good income vital. So what is going on.
Kai Rehwald, Michael
Rosholm, Michael Svarer, IZA: Are Public or Private Providers of Employment
Services More Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. This paper compares the effectiveness of public and
private providers of employment services. Reporting from a randomized field
experiment conducted in Denmark we assess empirically the case for contracting
out employment services for a well-defined group of highly educated job-seekers
(unemployed holding a university degree). Our findings suggest, first, that
private providers deliver more intense, employment-oriented, and earlier
services. Second, public and private provision of employment services are
equally effective regarding subsequent labour market outcomes. And third, the
two competing service delivery systems appear to be equally costly from a
public spending perspective.
Tim
Harford, The Undercover Economist: The real benefits of migration. Among policy wonks and fact-checkers, one statement
in the speech found the spotlight: “The evidence . . . shows that while there
are benefits of selective and controlled immigration, at best the net economic
and fiscal effect of high immigration is close to zero.” (Translation:
immigration costs us nothing but we want to reduce it anyway.) Is May’s summary
of the evidence correct? Probably not, although there is room for reasonable
people to disagree…But there was a far bigger lacuna in May’s speech, and most
commentators have missed it: the fact that these supposed costs or benefits
always omit one crucial group. That group is the migrants themselves. They
prosper hugely from being allowed to migrate yet that prosperity hardly ever
figures in debates about immigration.
Neeraj
Kaushal, Yao Lu, Nicole Denier, Julia Shu-Huah Wang, Stephen J. Trejo,
NBER: Immigrant Employment and Earnings
Growth in Canada and the U.S.: Evidence from Longitudinal Data. We study the short-term trajectories of employment,
hours worked, and real wages of immigrants in Canada and the U.S. using
nationally representative longitudinal datasets covering 1996-2008. Models with person fixed effects show that on
average immigrant men in Canada do not experience any relative growth in these
three outcomes compared to men born in Canada. Immigrant men in the U.S., on
the other hand, experience positive annual growth in all three domains relative
to U.S. born men. This difference is largely on account of low-educated immigrant
men, who experience faster or longer periods of relative growth in employment
and wages in the U.S. than in Canada. We
further compare longitudinal and cross-sectional trajectories and find that the
latter over-estimate wage growth of earlier arrivals, presumably reflecting
selective return migration.
Yves
Smith, Naked Capitalism: Stunning Rise in Death Rate, Pain Levels for
Middle-Aged, Less Educated Whites. One of the long standing patterns in economies
showing economic growth is longer life spans, and falls are see the result of
severe distress and dislocation, as took place in the period right after the
fall of the Soviet Union, when the expectancies of adult men fell by over seven
years. The US has just become the first country to approach this appalling
record. A stark warning about the level of distress in America comes from an
important study by Angus Deaton, the 2015 Nobel prize winner in economics, and
his wife Anne Case. We’ve embedded their short and readable article at the end
of this post. The authors found that from 1999 to 2013, the death rate among
non-Hispanic whites aged 45 to 54 with a high school education or less rose,
while it fell in other age and ethnic groups. This is an HIV-level silent
epidemic: AIDS killed an estimated 650,000 from the mid-1980s to present, while
an estimated close to half-million died in half that time period who would have
lived had their mortality rates fallen in line with the rest of the population.
It is hard to overstate the significance of these findings.
Mark
Thoma, The Fiscal Times: Are Economists Driven by Ideology or Evidence? The problem is that, in economics, the evidence
rarely delivers clear answers. That leads to ongoing disputes among economists,
and since ideology influences the questions researchers ask, these disputes are
often viewed along ideological lines.Again, so long as, in the end, economists
follow the evidence once it accumulates on one side or the other, I don’t see
this as a problem. But, despite the confidence in the academic community
expressed above, there have been some worrisome trends in recent years. Too
many economists have been unwilling to change their views on issues such as
whether quantitative easing in a deep recession will cause runaway inflation and
interest rate spikes despite clear evidence those views are wrong. That must
change. Our reputation with the public is bad enough as it is, and our best
hope of changing that is to be honest about the evidence, and follow it
wherever it might take us.
Angel
Ubide, Peterson Institute for International Economics: The Fed's Confusion over
Interest Rates. Ben
Bernanke, in his recently published memoirs, says that monetary policy is 98
percent communication and 2 percent action. During his tenure as a central
banker he scrupulously followed this principle. Unfortunately, in recent months
the Fed has created tremendous confusion with its communication policy, losing
much of the credibility it had gained. An accumulation of execution errors, not
a change in strategy, is beginning to take its toll. Markets are paying
increasingly less attention to Fed statements and warnings, and the gap between
market pricing and the Fed's public guidance on interest rates is increasing.
The more this disagreement continues, the harder it will be to solve it without
pain.
Julie
Hotchkiss, Atlanta Fed: Should We Be Concerned about Declines in Labor Force
Growth? For
the second month in a row, the October jobs report from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) has revealed a decline in the labor force. From August to
September, the labor force lost a seasonally adjusted 350,000 participants. And
the August number of participants was a seasonally adjusted 41,000 below July's
level. Although two months don't necessarily make a trend, observers have
noticed the declines in the labor force (here and here, for example), and they
deserve some attention. Labor is an important component in the production
process. Short of dramatic technological advancements, both the manufacturing
and service sectors need a consistent source of labor to fuel output. Even
though the economy appears to be on the right track with respect to job
creation, ongoing declines in labor force growth could pose a challenge to
economic growth. Additionally, as employers compete for fewer workers, we would
expect wages to be bid up. Keep an eye on the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker to see
how slowing labor force growth plays out in wages.
Robert
Z. Lawrence, VOX: Explaining recent declines in labour’s share in US income. The US debate over income inequality in the 1980s and
1990s focused on the growing disparity between the earnings of the skilled, the
unskilled and the super-rich. After the global crash, the decline in labour’s
share of national income has been added to these concerns. This column presents
an alternative explanation for this decline, arguing that limited substitution
possibilities between capital and labour combined with the acceleration in the
pace of labour-augmenting technical change raises the effective labour-capital
ratio. The policy implications of this alternative explanation are profoundly
different from those currently circulating.
Mona Larsen, Peder J.
Pedersen, IZA: Labor Force Activity after 60: Recent Trends in the Scandinavian
Countries with Germany as a Benchmark. In most OECD member countries labor force attachment
has increased in recent years in the 60+ group. Focus in the paper is on the
development in this area in Denmark, Norway and Sweden since the 1990s. The
development in the same period in the German labor market is included as a
frame of reference. Main emphasis is given to the development in two distinct
age groups, i.e. people in the first half of the 60s of which many are eligible
for early retirement programs and people older than 65 mostly eligible for
social security retirement programs. For these two age groups the actual
development in labor force participation is described based on register data
and on labor force surveys along with indicators of cohort relevant changes in
education and health. Focus in the paper includes also the gender aspect to
accommodate stronger cohort effects for women than for men. The impact on labor
force participation from individual education and from self-assessed health is
analyzed based on available micro data. Policy reforms and changes in the
retirement area have been enacted since the mid-1990s in the included countries
and more sweeping reforms are enacted or under review for the years ahead. We
include a brief survey of policy changes in the Scandinavian countries and
Germany as other determinants of labor force participation in the 60 and older
group.
OECD:
Children are paying a high price for today’s growing inequality. The OECD’s latest How’s Life? shows the extent to
which some children are getting a better start in life than others. Income
poverty affects one child in seven in OECD countries, while 10% of children
live in jobless households. Since the economic crisis, child poverty rates have
risen in two thirds of OECD countries. In most OECD countries, the poverty rate
for children is higher than for the population in general. Looking at child
well-being for the first time, the report shows how children from more affluent
backgrounds tend to have better health and a happier school life. Children from
less well-off families find fewer of their classmates to be kind and helpful
and are more likely to be bullied at school. Life satisfaction, reading and
problem-solving skills, communication with parents and intentions to vote in
national elections in later life are all lower among children from less
affluent backgrounds. Growing inequality among parents ends up sapping
opportunities available to their children.ooking at child well-being for the
first time, the report shows how children from more affluent backgrounds tend
to have better health and a happier school life. Children from less well-off
families find fewer of their classmates to be kind and helpful and are more
likely to be bullied at school. Life satisfaction, reading and problem-solving
skills, communication with parents and intentions to vote in national elections
in later life are all lower among children from less affluent backgrounds.
Growing inequality among parents ends up sapping opportunities available to
their children.
Alexander C.
Kaufman, The Huffington Post: Stephen Hawking Says We Should Really Be Scared
Of Capitalism, Not Robots. Machines won't
bring about the economic robot apocalypse -- but greedy humans will, according
to physicist Stephen Hawking. In a Reddit Ask Me Anything session on
Thursday, the scientist predicted that economic inequality will skyrocket
as more jobs become automated and the rich owners of machines
refuse to share their fast-proliferating wealth. “If machines produce
everything we need, the outcome will depend on how things are distributed.
Everyone can enjoy a life of luxurious leisure if the machine-produced wealth
is shared, or most people can end up miserably poor if the machine-owners
successfully lobby against wealth redistribution. So far, the trend seems to be
toward the second option, with technology driving ever-increasing inequality.”
William
B. Peterman and Kamila Sommer, FED: A Historical Welfare Analysis of Social
Security: Whom Did the Program Benefit? In a computational life cycle model that simulates
the Great Depression and the enactment of Social Security, this paper
quantifies the welfare effects of the program's enactment on the cohorts of
agents who experienced it. In contrast to the standard steady state results, we
find that the adoption of the original Social Security tended to improve these
cohorts' welfare. In particular, we estimate that the original program
benefited households alive at the time of the program's adoption with a
likelihood of over 80 percent, and increased these agents' welfare by the
equivalent of 5.9% of their expected future lifetime consumption. The welfare
benefit was particularly large for poorer agents and agents who were near
retirement age when the program was enacted. Through a series of counterfactual
experiments we demonstrate that the difference between the steady state and
transitional welfare effects is primarily driven by a slower adoption of
payroll taxes and a quicker adoption of benefit payments during the program's
phase-in. Overall, the opposite welfare effects experienced by agents in the
steady state versus agents who experienced the program's adoption might offer
one explanation for why a program that potentially reduces welfare in the
steady state was originally adopted.
Michael
Spence, James Manyyika, Project syndicate: Job-Saving Technologies. This is an age of anxiety about the job-killing
effects of automation, with dire headlines warning that the rise of robots will
render entire occupational categories obsolete. But this fatalism assumes that
we are powerless to harness what we create to improve our lives – and, indeed,
our jobs. Evidence of technology’s potential to help resolve our job concerns
can be found in online talent platforms. Digital platforms already have
transformed many parts of the economy. The online marketplaces built by Amazon
and Alibaba, for example, have reshaped the retail landscape, partly by
changing the local nature of retail markets.
Jack
Karsten and Darrell M. West, Brookings: Unlocking the potential of the Internet
of Things. Many
smartphone users already appreciate the power of having an Internet-connected
device in their pockets. That same power will extend to many more people in
developing countries as the price of basic smartphones continues to fall. The
biggest impacts from IoT may come from outside the realm of consumer
electronics, however. As the price of sensors also fall, larger numbers of
industrial machines and equipment will be connected to a network to provide
constant streams of performance data. The ability to track the data from
sensors has applications in many different areas. For example, measuring energy
consumption with sensors could lead to significant savings as inefficient
devices are identified. Health care delivery would benefit from sensors that monitor
patients remotely. The panelists also referenced the idea of a “smart city”
where vehicles and traffic lights are wirelessly connected to improve traffic
flows and reduce the number of accidents.
Kamilla Gumede, Michael
Rosholm, IZA: Your Move: The Effect of Chess on Mathematics Test Scores. We analyze the effect of substituting a weekly
mathematics lessons in primary school grades 1-3 with a lesson in mathematics
based on chess instruction. We use data from the City of Aarhus in Denmark,
combining test score data with a comprehensive data base from administrative
register. We use a difference-in-differences approach to investigate treatment
effects on the treated and tend to find positive effects. Looking at sub
groups, we find significant positive effects for native Danish children, while
we find no effects for children of immigrants.
Florence
Jaumotte, Carolina Osorio Buitron, VOX: Union power and inequality. Inequality in advanced economies has risen
considerably since the 1980s, largely driven by the increase of top earners’
income shares. This column revisits the drivers of inequality, emphasising the
role played by changes in labour market institutions. It argues that the
decline in union density has been strongly associated with the rise of top
income inequality and discusses the multiple channels through which
unionisation matters for income distribution.
Frank
Jacobs, Big Think: What the 'Ideal' Man Looks Like, Country by Country. What makes these 29 pairs of eyes even more
unsettling is the fact that these are not real people. Each face is a
composite, assembled from the mugshots of between 10 to 24 male athletes from
each of the 29 European countries represented here. This gallery of facial
averages is like a collection of artist's sketches of usual suspects pinned to
the bulletin board of a police station. Who are these imaginary men? What are
their faces trying to tell us? As averages of random but comparable samples by
country, these faces are uniquely "national." The French face is the
Frenchest face possible, and the German face couldn't be any more German, et
cetera. Does that mean these faces are merely average? Or are they in some way
"ideal"? Or — and this is even more disconcerting — could it perhaps
be that to be facially average is ideal?
Tom
Simonite, MIT Technology Review: You’ve Been Misled About What Makes a Good
Password. The
latest password guessing software is smarter than just guessing at random.
Instead it is trained using leaked lists of millions of passwords to make
guesses that try the passwords—or patterns found in passwords—most commonly
used first. Password-guessing software can be used to try to reveal improperly
encrypted passwords leaked online, like the 130 million taken from Adobe in
2013, or to directly access password-secured software or devices that don’t
limit guessing attempts. A study that tested state-of-the-art password-guessing
techniques found that requiring numbers and uppercase characters in passwords
doesn’t do much to make them stronger. Making a password longer or including
symbols was much more effective.
David Elliott,
Chris Jackson, Marek Raczko, Matt Roberts-Sklar: Do
moves in oil prices drive longer-term financial market inflation expectations?
The data imply an empirical link exists for the US and euro area, but not for
the UK. But this is unlikely to reflect a direct impact of oil on actual
expectations of future inflation at those long horizons. Instead, such changes in inflation swap rates
could reflect a range of factors other than inflation expectations, including
changes in investor behaviour, market structure and risk premia. All of which
adds a note of caution when trying to gauge inflation expectations from
market-based instruments.
Gaetano D'Adamo,
Riccardo Rovelli, IZA: Labour Market Institutions and Inflation Differentials
in the EU. Adopting a simple Phillips curve
framework, we show that different labour market institutions across EU
countries are associated with significant differences in the response of
inflation to unemployment and exchange rate shocks. More wage coordination and higher
union density flatten the Phillips curve and increase the inflation response to
the real exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate pass-through. In addition, using
a new approach to the classification of goods and services as
"traded" or "non-traded", we show that both these
institutional effects are significantly stronger for the more exposed (traded)
sector.
Eduardo
Porter, NYT: The myth of welfares corrupting influence on the poor. There is some disincentive effect
consistent with theory, but the economic magnitude is not large,” said James P.
Ziliak, head of the Center for Poverty Research at the University of Kentucky.
“Oftentimes these disincentive effects are overstated in the policy discourse.” On the other hand, welfare provides very
tangible benefits. New research shows that more cash welfare early in a child’s
life improves the child’s longevity, educational attainment and nutritional
status, and income in adulthood.
Richard Freeman, Eunice Han, David
Madland, Brendan V. Duke, NBER: How Does Declining Unionism Affect the American
Middle Class and Intergenerational Mobility? This paper examines unionism’s
relationship to the size of the middle class and its relationship to
intergenerational mobility. We use the PSID 1985 and 2011 files to examine the
change in the share of workers in a middle-income group (defined by persons
having incomes within 50% of the median) and use a shift-share decomposition to
explore how the decline of unionism contributes to the shrinking middle class.
We also use the files to investigate the correlation between parents’ union
status and the incomes of their children. Additionally, we use federal income
tax data to examine the geographical correlation between union density and
intergenerational mobility. We find: 1) union workers are disproportionately in
the middle-income group or above, and some reach middle-income status due to
the union wage premium; 2) the offspring of union parents have higher incomes
than the offspring of otherwise comparable non-union parents, especially when
the parents are low-skilled; 3) offspring from communities with higher union
density have higher average incomes relative to their parents compared to
offspring from communities with lower union density. These findings show a
strong, though not necessarily causal, link between unions, the middle class,
and intergenerational mobility.
Jason Furman,
Peter Orszag, President’s Council of Economic Advisers: A Firm-Level
Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality. There
has been a trend of increased dispersion of returns to capital across firms,
with an increasingly large fraction of firms getting returns over 10, 20 or 30
percent annually—a trend that somewhat precedes the shift in the profit share.
Longstanding evidence (e.g. Krueger and Summers 1988) has documented
substantial inter-industry differentials in pay—a mid-level analyst may have
the same marginal product wherever he or she works but is paid more at a
high-return company than at a low-return company. Newer evidence (Barth et al.
2014 and Song et al. 2015) suggests that much of the rise in earnings
inequality represents the increased dispersion of earnings between firms rather
than within firms. This is consistent with the combination of a rising
dispersion of returns at the firm level and the inter-industry pay differential
model, as well as with the notion that firms are wage setters rather than wage
takers in a less-than-perfectly-competitive marketplace.
OECD:
Tightening environmental policies have had little effect on productivity growth. Environmental
policies address wellbeing and sustainability objectives, affecting firm and
household behaviour. A newly developed OECD indicator (EPS) shows that
environmental policies have become more stringent over the past two decades.
Tightening environmental policies have spurred only short-term adjustments to
aggregate productivity growth. Nevertheless, they have led to various effects
within the economy. The most technologically advanced industries and firms have
seen a small increase in productivity, possibly as they were in the best
position to adapt. Least productive firms have seen their productivity fall
further.
Olof
Johansson-Stenman, Erik Mohlin, Ekonomistas: Blir man mer korrupt av att läsa
nationalekonomi? Statsvetaren Bo Rothstein
tycks mena att forskningen skulle visa att så är fallet. I ett
långt brev till Kungliga Vetenskapsakademin (KVA), samt i
en relaterad artikel på DN Debatt (11/10, 2015), argumenterar
han för att KVA därför tills vidare bör
upphöra med att dela ut Sveriges Riksbanks pris i ekonomisk
vetenskap till minne av Alfred Nobel.... Man brukar säga att extraordinära påståenden kräver extraordinära belägg. Hypotesen att nationalekonomiutbildningar skulle generera korruption är onekligen extraordinär, dock visade sig
de redovisade beläggen alltså i detta fall vara helt obefintliga.
Phil Bunn,
Lizzie Drapper, Alice Pugh, Jeremy Rowe, BoE: How important are households’
expectations for spending? If the car you’re thinking
of buying may be £500 cheaper in six months’ time, why not wait until then to
buy it? This kind of thinking is one reason why falling prices trouble central
bankers. The spectre of deflation is especially dangerous when households keep
delaying their spending in expectation of further price falls. With the economy
experiencing close to zero inflation, households may have adjusted their
expectations of future prices. But how important are these expectations in
influencing household spending? Using a rich household survey dataset we find
that while there is some evidence that lower inflation expectations lead to
lower spending, income expectations (reassuringly) also play an important role,
and they have picked up recently.
Kaarlo Reipas
and Mikko Sankala, Finnish Centre for Pensions: Retirement age will rise as
planned. According to
the projects the Government bill on the 2017 pension reform will lead to
retirement at a later age and a higher employment rate. As working lives are
extended, the pressure to increase the earnings-related pension contributions
will be alleviated and the average pensions will rise. The Finnish Centre for Pensions projects that
with the proposed amendments, the targeted average retirement age of 62.4 years
(62 yrs and 5 mos) would be achieved in the mid-2020s. Based on the projection, the average
effective retirement age by the year 2040 will be 63 years and 7 months. In the
long run, raising the old-age retirement age will raise the employment rate by
approximately two percentage points. By 2040, the number of employed will grow
by approximately 50,000 people, although the unemployment rate at the brink of
retirement will also rise.
Tim
Harford, The Undercover Economist: Peer-to-peer pressure. Are these new players providing a valuable new
service or are they merely an arbitrage play? It was exciting, for a while, to
realise that you could actually get a car home on a Saturday night in San
Francisco, or make money renting out your attic, but the backlash has been
simmering for some time. That backlash mixes two complaints, elegantly
exemplified when a group of taxicab owners and drivers sued Uber in Atlanta a
year ago. “Uber has been operating in Atlanta with little concern about the
safety of their passengers and zero concern for the laws that protect them,”
said one of the plaintiffs in a statement to The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.
“Our incomes have steadily dropped since Uber started and legally licensed
drivers are leaving the business.”
Ariana
Eunjung Cha, Washington Post: Thought process: Building an artificial brain. Now 62 and worth
an estimated $17.7 billion, the Microsoft co-founder is using his wealth to
back two separate philanthropic research efforts at the intersection of neuroscience
and artificial intelligence that he hopes will hasten that future. The first
project is to build an artificial brain from scratch that can pass a high
school science test. It sounds simple enough, but trying to teach a machine not
only to respond but also to reason is one of the hardest software-engineering
endeavors attempted — far more complex than building his former company’s
breakthrough Windows operating system, said to have 50 million lines of code. The
second project aims to understand intelligence by coming at it from the
opposite direction — by starting with nature and deconstructing and analyzing
the pieces. It’s an attempt to reverse-engineer the human brain by slicing it
up — literally — modeling it and running simulations.
Cass
R. Sunstein, The New York Review of Books: Why Free Markets Make Fools of Us.
Akerlof and Shiller believe that once we
understand human psychology, we will be a lot less enthusiastic about free
markets and a lot more worried about the harmful effects of competition. In
their view, companies exploit human weaknesses not necessarily because they are
malicious or venal, but because the market makes them do it. Those who fail to
exploit people will lose out to those who do. In making that argument, Akerlof
and Shiller object that the existing work of behavioral economists and
psychologists offers a mere list of human errors, when what is required is a
broader account of how and why markets produce systemic harm.
Ludger
Schuknecht, FT: What the bankers can teach stimulus-addicted economists. Germany’s sound public finances are the basis for
European stability. Without guarantees and support from Berlin, the €500bn
European Stability Mechanism, meant to protect against future crises, would not
be credible. Were it not for the strength of Germany’s economy and balance
sheet, the European Central Bank would have much less scope to use
unconventional policies and remain credible. Not to mention the fact that
Berlin is one of the largest contributors to the EU’s €150bn annual budget, a
significant part of which is transferred to the poorer countries of Europe and
beyond. In the increasingly globalised economy, nations lacking resilience
increasingly rely on support from others who fear that, unless they commit
their own resources to fighting faraway crises, they will find themselves
engulfed by the gathering storm. This creates a new form of moral hazard: since
countries that behave recklessly will be bailed out, they have little incentive
to reform
Sushant
Acharya, Alvaro Pedraza, FED NY: Natural
Experiment Sheds Light on the Market Effects of Herding. This blog
analysis underscores how certain financial regulation might have unintended
consequences by altering the behavior of investors in a perverse fashion. The Minimum
Return Guarantee MRG is intended to protect the interests of pension-fund
beneficiaries by limiting unnecessary risk-taking by fund managers. However, by
relying on a benchmark based on peer returns, the regulation incentivizes
herding. Consequently, asset prices can move in the short and medium run due to
forces independent of fundamentals. Whether the welfare loss from this
increased financial market inefficiency is clouded by the reduction in other
forms of risk-taking is still an open question and requires further investigation.
Martin Wolf,
Foreign Affairs (2015): Same as it Ever Was. Why the Techno-optimists Are Wrong. What we know for the moment is that there is nothing
extraordinary in the changes we are now experiencing. We have been here before
and on a much larger scale. But the current and prospective rounds of changes
still create problems—above all, the combination of weak growth and significant
increases in inequality. The challenge, as always, is to manage such changes.
The only good reason to be pessimistic is that we are doing such a poor job of
this.
American
Educational Research Association: Are American schools making inequality worse? The answer appears to be yes. Schooling plays a
surprisingly large role in short-changing the nation's most economically
disadvantaged students of critical math skills. Findings from the study indicate
that unequal access to rigorous mathematics content is widening the gap in
performance on a prominent international math literacy test between low- and
high-income students, not only in the United States but in countries worldwide.
Using data from the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA),
conducted by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), researchers from Michigan State University and OECD
confirmed not only that low-income students are more likely to be exposed to
weaker math content in schools, but also that a substantial share of the gap in
math performance between economically advantaged and disadvantaged students is
related to those curricular inequalities.
Jay
Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert, NBER: Nudges in
Exercise Commitment Contracts: A Randomized Trial. We consider the welfare consequences of nudges and
other behavioral economic devices to encourage exercise habit formation. We
analyze a randomized trial of nudged exercise commitment contracts in the
context of a time-inconsistent intertemporal utility maximization model of the
demand for exercise. The trial follows more than 4,000 people seeking to make
exercise commitments. Each person was randomly nudged towards making longer (20
weeks) or shorter (8 weeks) exercise commitment contracts. Our empirical
analysis shows that people who are interested in exercise commitment contracts
choose longer contracts when nudged to do so, and are then more likely to meet
their pre-stated exercise goals. People are also more likely to enroll in a
subsequent commitment contract after the original expires if they receive a
nudge for a longer duration initial contract. Our theoretical analysis of the
welfare implications of these effects shows conditions under which nudges can
reduce utility even when they succeed in the goal of promoting habitual
exercise.
Michael
Grossman, NBER: The Relationship between Health and Schooling: What's New? Many studies suggest that years of formal schooling
completed is the most important correlate of good health. There is much less consensus as to whether
this correlation reflects causality from more schooling to better health. The relationship may be traced in part to
reverse causality and may also reflect "omitted third variables" that
cause health and schooling to vary in the same direction. The past five years
(2010-2014) have witnessed the development of a large literature focusing on
the issue just raised. I deal with that
literature and what can be learned from it in this paper. I conclude that there is enough conflicting
evidence in the studies that I have reviewed to warrant more research on the
question of whether more schooling does in fact cause better health outcomes.
Simon
Caulkin, Harvard Business Review: Staying Human in the Robot Age. Invasion has been interpreted in different ways,
which is the beauty of imaginative human creations. Viewed today, however, one
reading suggests itself above any other: the threat to human-ness is not
communist or right-wing infiltration (the film came out when the Cold War was
in full swing), but technology – particularly digital technology, whose
seductions make all too easy the draining away of humanity that the doctor
observes in his patients. New workplace technology makes possible an
unprecedented degree of control over working (and sometimes private) life. A
wealth of information creates poverty of attention. More and more of human
lives are marketized and commodified on technology platforms. Homes and cars
via Uber and Airbnb; personal and medical details, likes and preferences, are
for sale via search and social media.
Elizabeth
Palermo, Livescience: Sizzling Longevity: World's Oldest Person Eats Bacon
Daily. Could it be
that a few slices of bacon a day keep the doctor away? The world's oldest
living person, Susannah Mushatt Jones of Brooklyn, New York, recently said that
she eats a serving of bacon every day. Jones, who turned 116 on July 6 and was
crowned the world's oldest living person by Guinness World Records that month,
confessed her bacon habit in an interview published this week on the New York
Post's site Page Six. So far, the Internet is having a field day with this
information. "If the world's oldest woman eats bacon every day, we can too
— right?"