Olivier Armantier,
John J. Conlon, and Wilbert van der Klaauw, NY FED: Political Polarization in
Consumer Expectations. Following the 2016 presidential election, as noted on
this blog and many other outlets, Americans’ political and economic outlook changed dramatically
depending on partisan affiliation. Immediately after the election, Republicans
became substantially more optimistic relative to Democrats. In this blog
post, we revisit the issue of polarization over the past twelve months using
data from the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)—also the
focus of a detailed technical overview in the latest edition of the Bank’s
journal, the Economic Policy Review.
Peter Klenow,
Stanford University: Examining the Slowdown in U.S. Rate of Growth: It Has More to Do with Technology than with
China. NBER reviews proposed causes of the United States'
declining rate of growth: low growth at young firms, rapid spread of robots,
the challenge from China. He and other researchers, whose work can be found on
the Bureau's new page on
Productivity and Growth, are increasingly focused on the impacts of
technological change. The impacts of robotics and other new technologies are
cause for concern, but not a reason to reject the changes, they argue. Reallocation
of labor and creative destruction are essential to growth.
Nicholas Bloom,
Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen, Michael Webb, NBER: Are Ideas Getting Harder
to Find? In many growth models,
economic growth arises from people creating ideas, and the long-run growth rate
is the product of two terms: the effective number of researchers and their
research productivity. We present a wide range of evidence from various industries,
products, and firms showing that research effort is rising substantially while
research productivity is declining sharply. A good example is Moore's Law. The
number of researchers required today to achieve the famous doubling every two
years of the density of computer chips is more than 18 times larger than the
number required in the early 1970s. Across a broad range of case studies at various levels of
(dis)aggregation, we find that ideas — and in particular the exponential growth
they imply — are getting harder and harder to find. Exponential growth results
from the large increases in research effort that offset its declining
productivity.
Oguzhan Akgun,
Boris Cournède, Jean-Marc Fournier, OECD: The effects of the tax mix on
inequality and growth. Can reforms that
shift the balance among different taxes in the revenue mix lastingly influence
the overall prosperity of an economy and the distribution of income across
households? The present study takes this question to the data, using the
experience of 34 OECD countries over 1980-2014 to assess the effects of changes
in the tax structure on the long-term level of average output per capita and
the distribution of disposable income across households. Changing the revenue
mix while keeping government size constant typically lift long-term output per
capita when they involve cuts in the labour tax wedge below or above average
incomes, cuts in corporate income taxes or increases in property taxes. The relative-income effects of
revenue-neutral reductions in labour tax wedges are broadly in line with
intuition: the relative position of those benefitting from them typically
improves. In absolute terms, however, nearly all the income distribution
benefits from revenue-neutral reductions in labour tax wedges, be they focused
on below or average income earners.
Gregori
Galofré-Vilà, Christopher M. Meissner, Martin McKee, David Stuckler, NBER:
Austerity and the rise of the Nazi party. It has been speculated that fiscally contractionary austerity
measures, including spending cuts and tax rises, contributed to votes for the
Nazi party especially among middle- and upper-classes who had more to lose from
them. We use voting data from 1,024 districts in Germany on votes cast for the
Nazi and rival Communist and Center parties between 1930 and 1933, evaluating
whether radical austerity measures, measured as the combination of tax
increases and spending cuts, contributed to the rise of the Nazis. Our analysis shows that
chancellor Brüning’s austerity measures were positively associated with
increasing vote shares for the Nazi party. Depending on how we measure
austerity and the elections we consider, each 1 standard deviation increase in
austerity is associated with a 2 to 5 percentage point increase in vote share
for the Nazis. Consistent with existing evidence, we find that
unemployment rates were linked with greater votes for the Communist party. The
coalition that allowed a majority to form government in March 1933 might not
have been able to form had fiscal policy been more expansionary.
Maria D.
Fitzpatrick, Timothy J. Moore, NBER: The Mortality Effects of Retirement:
Evidence from Social Security Eligibility at Age 62. Social Security eligibility begins at age 62, and
approximately one third of Americans immediately claim at that age. We examine
whether age 62 is associated with a discontinuous change in aggregate
mortality, a key measure of population health. Using mortality data that covers the entire U.S.
population and includes exact dates of birth and death, we document a robust
two percent increase in male mortality immediately after age 62. The change in
female mortality is smaller and imprecisely estimated. Additional analysis
suggests that the increase in male mortality is connected to retirement from
the labor force and associated lifestyle Changes.
Erich Battistin,
Lorenzo Neri, IZA: School Performance, Score Inflation and Economic Geography. We show that
grading standards for primary school exams in England have triggered an
inflation of quality indicators in the national performance tables for almost
two decades. The cumulative effects have resulted in significant differences in
the quality signaled to parents for otherwise identical schools. These differences are as good as
random, with score inflation resulting from discretion in the grading of
randomly assigned external markers. We find large housing price gains from the
school quality improvements artificially signaled by inflation as well as lower
deprivation and more businesses catering to families in local neighborhoods.
The design ensures improved external validity for the valuation of school
quality with respect to boundary discontinuities and has the potential for
replication outside of our specific case study.
Murat Iyigun,
Nathan Nunn, Nancy Qian, NBER: The Long-run Effects of Agricultural
Productivity on Conflict, 1400-1900. This paper provides evidence of the long-run effects of a permanent
increase in agricultural productivity on conflict. We construct a newly
digitized and geo-referenced dataset of battles in Europe, the Near East and
North Africa covering the period between 1400 and 1900 CE. For variation in
permanent improvements in agricultural productivity, we exploit the
introduction of potatoes from the Americas to the Old World after the Columbian
Exchange. We find that the
introduction of potatoes permanently reduced conflict for roughly two
centuries. The results are driven by a reduction in civil conflicts.
Zuzana Irsova,
Tomas Havranek, Dominik Herman, Project Syndicate: Daylight saving saves no
energy. The original rationale for daylight saving time was
energy savings. This column reveals, however, that the modern empirical literature on the topic finds
no savings on average. The extent of savings is related to latitude – regions
at higher latitude enjoy slightly more savings, but subtropical regions consume
more energy because of daylight saving time. Even in Scandinavia, the savings
amount to just 0.3% of annual energy consumption. Policymakers must look
at other effects of daylight saving time to justify the continued use of the
policy.
Bjørn Lomborg,
Project Syndicate: A Climate Cure Worse than the Disease. The climate
policies lauded in Paris at the One Planet Summit this month are essentially
high-cost, low-effect gestures. While the EU will devote 20% of its budget this year to climate-related
action, even fully achieving the accord's emissions targets throughout this
century would prevent just 0.053°C of global warming by 2100.
Hunt Allcott,
Rebecca Diamond, Jean-Pierre Dubé, NBER: The Geography of Poverty and
Nutrition: Food Deserts and Food Choices Across the United States. We study the causes of “nutritional inequality”: why
the wealthy tend to eat more healthfully than the poor in the U.S. Using two
event study designs exploiting entry of new supermarkets and households' moves
to healthier neighborhoods, we reject that neighborhood environments have
economically meaningful effects on healthy eating. Using a structural demand
model, we find that exposing
low-income households to the same food availability and prices experienced by
high-income households would reduce nutritional inequality by only 9%, while
the remaining 91% is driven by differences in demand. In turn, these
income-related demand differences are partially explained by education,
nutrition knowledge, and regional preferences. These findings contrast
with discussions of nutritional inequality that emphasize supply-side issues
such as food deserts.
David G.
Blanchflower, Andrew J. Oswald,IZA: Unhappiness and Pain in Modern America: A
Review Essay, and Further Evidence, on Carol Graham's Happiness for All? In Happiness for All?, Carol Graham raises disquieting
ideas about today's United States. The challenge she puts forward is an
important one. Here we review the intellectual case and offer additional
evidence. We conclude broadly on the author's side. Strikingly, Americans appear to be in greater pain
than citizens of other countries, and most sub-groups of citizens have
downwardly trended happiness levels. There is, however, one bright side to an
otherwise dark story. The happiness of black Americans has risen strongly since
the 1970s. It is now almost equal to that of white Americans.
David Ignatius,
Washington Post: How to protect against fake ‘facts’. Amid the slithering mess of problems that emerged in
2017, the one that bothers me most is that people don’t seem to know what’s
true anymore. “Facts” this year got put in quotation marks. All the other
political difficulties of the Donald Trump era are subsumed in this one. If we aren’t sure what’s true,
how can we act to make things better? If we don’t know where we are on the map,
how do we know which way to move? Democracy assumes a well-informed citizenry
that argues about solutions — not about facts.
Tim Harford, The
Undercover Economist: Fatal Attraction of Fake Facts Sours Political Debate. It
is hard to overstate how corrosive this development is. Reasoned conversation
becomes impossible; the debaters hardly have time to clear their throats before
a fly-blown moggie hits the table with a rancid thud. Nor is it easy to
neutralise a big, politicised lie. Trustworthy nerds can refute it, of
course: the fact-checkers, the independent think-tanks, or statutory bodies
such as the UK Statistics Authority. But a politician who is unafraid to lie is
also unafraid to smear these organisations with claims of bias or corruption —
and then one problem has become two. The Statistics Authority and other
watchdogs need to guard jealously their reputation for truthfulness; the
politicians they contradict often have no such reputation to worry about.
Scott Adams,
Business Insider: The creator of Dilbert explains Trump's persuasion style and
reminds us why people stopped caring about facts. In this excerpt from "Win Bigly," Dilbert
creator Scott Adams says both he and Trump use
the same method of persuasion. The method involves making claims that contain
exaggerations or factual errors. Adams credits the method with raising his own
profile ahead of the 2016 US presidential election — and with Trump's election
win. Adams says he doesn't prefer to ignore facts. It's just that a
"Master Persuader" can do it and still come out on top.
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