Thursday, January 21, 2016

DECEMBER 4 2015

Lawrence H. Summers, Harvard University: Conference - Making Sense of the Productivity Slowdown. Peterson Institute for International Economics. If technical change is a major source of dis-employment, it is hard to see how it could be a major source of dis-employment without also being a major source of productivity improvement. In part, if the technology is replacing people that means that productivity should be expected to go up at least if you measure simple labor productivity. And if more of that is happening than used to be happening, then you would expect productivity to be rising more rapidly than it used to be rising. There is the further wonkier, but not that wonky observation that if the lower tail of the workforce is increasingly not working, than if you remove the least productive people, the average productivity of those who remain should be increasing. So, I think, the largest thing that I do not understand in this area, is how to square the “new economy is producing substantial dis-employment” view, with the “productivity growth is slowing” view.

Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: Does “Early Education” Come Way Too Late?Kids could be really high achievers in terms of math and reading but gain nothing from our program if they didn’t have these sort of sit-still skills. But on the other hand if you were above average on these non-cognitive skills, you got huge benefits from our program. So what does this mean? Well, for one thing, I think it intuitively makes sense — that there’s a threshold for being able to learn. If the kids can’t concentrate, it’s hard for them to learn and no matter how hard the parents try it’s going to be hard to make gains. On the other hand, what it’s really valuable for from the perspective of public policy is that it really tells you where to target your resources.”
Roland Fryer, NBER: What Makes Charter Schools Work? For Whom Do They Work Best? Charter schools one of the most innovative developments in education reform in the past few decades.

James Surowiecki, The New Yorker: The Rise and Fall of For-Profit Schools. Not too long ago, for-profit colleges looked like the future of education. Targeting so-called “nontraditional students”—who are typically older, often have jobs, and don’t necessarily go to school full time—they advertised aggressively to attract business, claiming to impart marketable skills that would lead to good jobs. They invested heavily in online learning, which enabled them to operate nationwide and to keep costs down….Today, the for-profit-education bubble is deflating. Regulators have been cracking down on the industry’s misdeeds—most notably, lying about job-placement rates. In May, Corinthian Colleges, once the second-largest for-profit chain in the country, went bankrupt. Enrollment at the University of Phoenix has fallen by more than half since 2010; a few weeks ago, the Department of Defense said that it wouldn’t fund troops who enrolled there. Other institutions have experienced similar declines.
Paul Krugman, NYT: Hyperglobalization and Global Inequality. I’ve mentioned before that I’m a big fan of work by my CUNY colleague Branko Milanovic showing that if you look at income growth by percentile of the whole world population for the past 25 years, you see “twin peaks”: rapid growth near the middle, representing China’s middle class, and at the top, representing the global elite, with a sag in the region representing the OECD working class. But was it always thus? I asked Branko what a similar picture looked like for the previous generation — and he has obliged.

Davide Furceri, Prakash Loungani, IMF: Openness and Inequality: Distributional Impacts of Capital Account Liberalization. It is well accepted that trade generates winners and losers. The past few decades have seen increases not just in trade in goods and services but trade in assets, as countries relax restrictions on the ability of capital to flow across national boundaries. Surprisingly, while the impact of trade in goods and services on inequality has been extensively studied, little attention has been paid to the distributional impacts of opening up capital markets. Our paper fills this gap. Using a data set for nearly 150 countries from 1970 to 2010, we show that increases in capital account liberalization are followed by increases in inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. However, we also show two channels where evidence of this association is limited: First, the impact of liberalization on inequality is smaller for countries with higher levels of financial development and inclusion. Second, the impact is also smaller in cases where the liberalization is not followed by a crisis.

Henry J. Aaron, Gary Burtless, Brookings: Potential Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Income Inequality. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will improve the well-being and incomes of Americans in the bottom fifth of the income distribution. Under our broadest and most comprehensive income measure we project that incomes in the bottom one-fifth of the distribution will increase almost 6%; those in the bottom one-tenth of the distribution will rise more than 7%. These estimated gains represent averages. Most people already have insurance coverage that will be left largely unaffected by reform. Those who gain subsidized insurance will see bigger percentage gains in their income.
Jesper Roine, Ekonomistas: Är det verkligen sant att ”vi arbetar mer än någonsin och mår dåligt”? Vi arbetar mer än någonsin och mår dåligt. Så varför ska vi ens – när maskinerna kan sköta jobbet – bry oss?”. Så börjar en uppmärksammad intervju med Roland Paulsen i modemagasinet Bon som publicerades häromveckan. Den inledningen har två iögonfallande fel och antyder dessutom en tredje missuppfattning om vad ”arbete” betyder. Det första och mest uppenbara felet har förstås att göra med konstaterandet att vi ”arbetar mer än någonsin”.

Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, NBER: Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action. This paper discusses the two leading views of history and political institutions. For some scholars, institutions are mainly products of historical logic, while for others, accidents, leaders, and decisions have a significant impact. We argue that while there is clear evidence that history matters and has long-term effects, there is not enough data to help us distinguish between the two views. Faced with this uncertainty, what is a social scientist to do? We argue that given the possibility that policy decisions indeed make a difference, it makes sense to assume they do and to try to improve policymaking

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